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industrialised countries.
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1. Introduction
 
This paper studies market selection mechanisms in firm’s productivity
and entry and exit patterns in French manufacturing industries for 1990-
2002.  We compute different performance indicators (Size, Total Factor
Productivity (TFP), Labour Productivity (LP) and Profitability) for all French
firms with more than 20 employees, operating in the manufacturing sector.
We follow the productive performance of entering, continuing, and exiting
firms over time in order to examine the efficiency of market selection
mechanisms. 
The crucial role of markets in selecting among heterogeneous firms has
been emphasised in standard industrial dynamic models which integrate
micro-level productivity heterogeneity within the dynamic general equilibri-
um framework of analysis (see Jovanovic, 1982, Lippman and Rumelt, 1982,
Ericson and Pakes, 1989, 1995, and Hopenhayn, 1992).  More fundamental-
ly, it echoes the basic claim (especially within the evolutionary strand of
economic literature, see, Nelson and Winter, 1982, Dosi, 1988), that
economic Darwinism is a central feature of the market economy dynamics. 
The idea that selection processes play an important role in market-
based economies has been tested in large-scale empirical studies only
recently.  This may be explained by the fact that Longitudinal Micro-
datasets (LMDs) were made available from the late 1970s.  Prior to this,
access to those datasets was restricted, both because of Statistical Office
restrictions and also because of computational limitations.  Both impedi-
ments have been virtually overcome during the two last decades and there
has been a surge in empirical investigations using LMDs in a large variety of
countries (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000 and Tybout, 2000 for recent
surveys). 
In this paper, we continue this line of empirical research looking for
evidence of a relationship between firm productivity and industrial
dynamics within the French economy.  Our principal objectives are to
investigate the extent to which natural selection mechanisms affect French
manufacturing industries, using conventional TFP indexes to measure firm-
level productivity and to investigate the extent to which efficiency criteria
play similar roles at different stages of the firm’s life cycle.  This latter
objective is motivated by the fact that the institutions that help markets to
operate selection processes in European countries have recently been
pointed as inefficient, especially those in France, in promoting the growth
of young firms and, consequently, in supporting the process of creative
destruction that allows for aggregate productivity growth (see Bartelsman
 
et al.
 
, 2005).  In this paper, we investigate this idea further by distinguishing
between young and mature firms when we compare the relative
performances of exiting and surviving firms. 
Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman (1995) conducted a somewhat similar study.
Their study sheds light on the relative importance of pure natural selection
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and learning mechanisms in shaping post-entry patterns.  It shows that
pure selection— i.e. selection based on intrinsic productivity differences—
is more important during firms’ infancy, while differences in learning
abilities are more important in shaping post-entry growth.  Our paper can
be seen as extending their analysis to the pre-exit patterns of mature firms.
Finally, in focusing on the distinction between young and mature firms, our
paper overlaps with the literature that emphasises the distinction between
small and large firms (Acs and Audretsch, 2005)
 
1
 
.
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 describes the dataset and the productivity measure used in this
study.  In Section 4, we focus on young firms and describe the relationship
between productivity, firm heterogeneity and post-entry performance.  In
Section 5, we conduct a similar exercise for mature firms, describing the
relationship between productivity, firm heterogeneity and pre-exit
performances.  Section 6 reports on aggregate productivity decomposition
and examines which population contributes to which productivity growth.
Section 7 concludes.
 
2. Literature background
 
In market-based economies, firms are continuously subject to market
selection forces.  The determinants of the relative abilities of firms to
survive in competitive markets are diverse and complex.  Various aspects
that characterise this microeconomic heterogeneity and how it relates to
industrial dynamics (through entry, exit and reallocation of market shares)
can be identified in the literature.  Basically, the link between firm
heterogeneity and industrial dynamics can be tackled from two different
streams of economic thinking: evolutionary economics and neo-classical
industrial dynamics. 
Evolutionary economics has for a long time dealt with empirical
analyses aimed at characterising patterns of industry evolution.  Starting
with Nelson and Winter (1982), who emphasised the importance of
variety and selection mechanisms at industry level for aggregate patterns of
economic growth, a huge number of studies has tried to deal with industry
and firm heterogeneity and to discuss its influence on economic
performance.  Gort and Klepper (1982) emphasised the importance of
technical change (innovation) to determine critical industry characteristics
such as entry rates or number of firms in an industry, within a five-stage
cycle that they identified from a study based on a sample of product
innovation.  The focus of evolutionary economics in relation to micro-
economic behaviour has largely been on the sources and processes of
 
1.  Farinas and Ruano (2005) distinguish between large and small firms, but their underlying
theoretical model (the Hopenayn 1992 model) rules out any independent impact of firm size on
relative performance. 
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innovation (Dosi, 1988).  As a consequence, the emphasis is mainly on the
main characteristics of firm innovative activities.  Firm heterogeneity is
captured by various factors such as technological gaps, differences in
search procedures and differences in behaviours.  An illustration of this can
be found in the self-organisation model suggested by Silverberg, Dosi and
Orsenigo (1988) and the whole family of history-friendly models of
industry evolution (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002). 
Authors dealing with empirical analyses were initially interested in
explaining firm size-distributions.  Important advances were made by
Mansfield (1962), Hall (1987), Audretsch (1995), Klepper (1996), and
Sutton (1997).  In an evolutionary perspective, there have been some
recent new insights in work by Bottazzi and Secchi (2003, 2005).  As firm
size is thought to be a critical factor to correlate with firm performance or
innovation within the evolutionary stream, it also highlights the importance
of technological development as an explanatory variable of firm
heterogeneity (McKelvey, 1996; Saviotti, 1998).  Alternatively, we can
examine the patterns and determinants of entry (Geroski, Machin, and Van
Reenen, 1993; Geroski, 1995, Audretsch, 1995), the reasons for successful
market entry (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995),
or the characteristics of exiting firms and their propensity to exit. 
On the whole, these attempts help to explain the diversity of firm
behaviours in relation to the importance of the entry process, and the role
of size in firm growth in relation either to competitive pressure (the stage
of industry dynamics) or innovation pressure (the importance of R&D
investment especially) (see Dosi, 2005).
With reference to neo-classical analysis, the link between firm heteroge-
neity (idiosyncratic uncertainty) and industrial dynamics (entry, exit and
reallocation of market shares) was first integrated into the standard general
equilibrium framework by Jovanovic (1982) and Lippman and Rumelt
(1982).  For a long time, competitive equilibrium models of industry
evolution were based on stochastic processes of prices, investment and
outputs but did not include firm-level heterogeneity.  In Jovanovic’s (1982)
paper, firms are endowed at birth with a time invariant profitability
parameter, which determines the distribution of its future profit stream.  A
new firm does not know what is its relative efficiency (its cost function), but
discovers it through the process of Bayesian learning from actual post-entry
profit realisations.  Consequently, young firms have higher failure probabili-
ties and more volatile growth rates.  The model then allows for interesting
patterns of industry dynamics to be reproduced in which firm size
distribution can be stable over time despite the introduction of turbulence
at firm level (through entry rates, failure of entrants, or displacement of
incumbents through the growth of successful entrants).  Ericson and Pakes
(1989, 1995) enhance the model by assuming that firms know about the
current value of the parameter that determines the distribution of their
profits which is a function of the vector of firm-specific state variables
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representing ‘market structure’.  However, in these models, the value
changes over time in response to the stochastic outcomes of firms’ own
investments, and those of other firms in the same oligopolistic market.  A
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium then results from both an investment and
liquidation rule applied to reconcile firm’s perceptions of the distribution of
future market structures with the objective distribution of market struc-
tures generated from firms’ actual choices.
In relation to empirical analysis, the neo-classical stream tends to
concentrate on assessing whether or not market selection mechanisms are
efficient.  Following Baily, Campbell and Hulten’s (1992) pioneering paper,
a vast literature of studies on the extent to which entry and exit patterns
are related to productivity differentials among firms has accumulated.  A
non-exhaustive list includes contributions by Haltiwanger (1997), Foster 
 
et
al.
 
 (1998) for the United States, Griliches and Regev (1995) for Israel, Liu
and Tybout (1996) and Eslava 
 
et al.
 
 (2003) for Chile and Colombia, Hahn
(2000) and Awe, Chen and Roberts (2001) for South Korea and Taiwan,
Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) for United Kingdom, Nishimura,
Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) for Japan, and Farinas and Ruano (2005) for
Spain.  Scarpetta 
 
et al.
 
  (2002) and Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi
(2003) contribute by providing comparisons of the contribution of
turnover to productivity growth among 10 countries, including France
 
2
 
. 
It is now widely accepted that exiting firms are usually concentrated in the
lowest part of the productivity distribution, suggesting that markets contrib-
ute to aggregate productivity in rightly selecting against inefficient firms.
Evidence of this natural selection mechanism (NSM) has been found in a large
variety of countries.
 
3
 
 Nonetheless, depending on a potentially large variety of
factors, market selection processes work more or less efficiently across
countries, industries and over time.  For instance, Scarpetta 
 
et al.
 
 (2002)
found instances of exit by firms with good relative productivity levels in
downturn times and firms in mature and/or restructuring industries.  Nish-
imura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2005) maintain that NMS mechanisms do not
operate in periods of severe recession, as indicated by the fact that, over the
last decade in the recessive Japanese economy, mature unproductive
Japanese firms have remained in the market while younger efficient ones have
exited.  Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) compare data for Taiwan and South
Korea from 1983 to 1993, a period of rapid economic expansion for both
those economies.  They show that institutions in Taiwan were more effective
in supporting the market selection process against unproductive firms and
that plant and firm turnover contributed much more to the productivity
growth of manufacturing industries in Taiwan than in Korea. 
 
2.  The others countries are the United States, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal. 
3.  More surprisingly, similar evidence has even been found in the case of developing countries,
even though sources of markets distortion can be thought of as particularly prevalent in those
countries (see Tybout, 2000 for a survey of empirical evidence on the developing World
 
).
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Our paper extends this line of empirical research by reporting new
evidence in the case of France.  In this work we intend to capitalise on
theoretical insights from both the evolutionary and the neo-classical strands
of literature, especially those related to the role of market pressure in
selection mechanisms.  We discuss those insights from an empirical
viewpoint by documenting the evolution of different populations of firms
(entrants, incumbents and exiting firms) and by emphasising the importance
of firm age in the ability to resist market selection forces.  More specifically,
we emphasise the fact that market selection mechanisms impact differently
on young and mature firms within the same industry.  We then investigate
how market selection mechanisms have impacted on aggregate productivity
growth of the French manufacturing sector during the 1990s.
 
3. A comprehensive dataset on French manufacturing firms
 
3.1. Data sources
 
The firm-level data used in this paper were collected by the French
Ministry of Industry (SESSI).  The French manufacturing census (EAE
 
4
 
) is a
unique survey collecting information about inputs and outputs of all firms
with more than 20 employees.  These data allow us to trace in some detail
the performance of firms over time.  Unlike almost all the existing
literature,
 
5
 
 our data were directly collected at firm rather than plant level,
which means that we are dealing with firm, not plant, turnover.  The
advantage is that it avoids potential spurious effects when assessing the
specific role of market selection in productivity growth.  A plant closure is
never the direct consequence of a market selection process; it is the result
of the firm’s decision.  A firm may decide to close a plant because it is not
sufficiently productive.  This is not a pure market selection process; it is
internally decided by the firm and depends on the ability of the firm to
restructure, and on the capacity of the market to dissuade firms from
getting rid of unproductive units.  To assess the contribution of market
selection to productivity growth (and not the firm’s capabilities to
restructure), firm turnover rather than plant turnover is more useful.
Additional industry-level data, mainly used in productivity computa-
tions, come from the INSEE database (French System of National Ac-
counts).  These data are described in the Annex to this paper.
 
3.2. Entry and exit patterns
 
We rely on the following standard definition for entrant, continuing and
exiting firms: an entrant is a firm that exists in the reference year t, but not
 
4.  
 
Enquête annuelle d’entreprises.
 
5.  Notable exceptions are Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001), Carreira and Teixeira, 2003,
Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2005), and Farinas and Ruano (2005).
 PRODUCTIVITY AND MARKET SELECTION OF FRENCH MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN THE NINETIES
 
325
 
OFCE/June 2006
 
in 
 
t
 
 – 1
 
.  An exiting firm is a firm that exists in year 
 
t
 
 but not in 
 
t
 
 + 1
 
.  A
continuing firm is a firm that exists in years 
 
t
 
, 
 
t
 
 + 1
 
 and 
 
t
 
 – 1
 
6
 
.  When applied
to our dataset, these definitions induce some re-entry phenomena,
essentially due to the +20 employee threshold effect,
 
7
 
 which induces an
overestimation of firm turnover rates.  However, this problem concerns
only the smallest firms in the sample should not greatly bias the inputs or
output-weighted entry and exit rates.
Based on these definitions, firms’ entry and exit rates average about 9%
and 10%, respectively.  Firm turnover rates
 
8
 
 average 18% per annum,
displaying a slightly decreasing trend over the period (see Table 1 and
Table 2).  These numbers are slightly lower than those reported by
Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003) for France.  Their firm turnover
rate for manufacturing was around 24% per year in the period 1989-1994,
which makes France as a relatively high turnover country in comparison
with other OECD countries.  This turnover figure is significantly reduced
when related employment is included (Table 2).  Whether entrants or
exiting firms, both populations are much smaller than that of continuing
firms. 
Another feature of our dataset, which is in line with the existing
literature, is that industries differ significantly according to their turnover
 
6.  In accordance with the OCDE definition (see Bartelsman Scarpetta and Schivardi 2003), firms
existing for only one year are considered as “one year firms” and are counted neither as entrants
nor exiting firms. 
7.  For instance, a firm reduces its number of workers and falls out of the range of the French
census, but still exists in the market.
8.  The turnover rate is defined as the sum of the entry rate and the exit rate. 
 
1. Entry and exit by year
 
Year Entrant Continuing Exiting Turnover rate
1990 1 887 19 351 1 738 18.7
1991 2 130 19 181 2 057 21.8
1992 1 683 18 896 2 415 21.7
1993 1 157 18 295 2 284 18.8
1994 1 961 17 785 1 667 20.4
1995 1 511 17 816 1 930 19.3
1996 1 644 17 679 1 648 18.6
1997 1 626 17 828 1 495 17.5
1998 1 374 18 007 1 447 15.7
1999 1 304 17 911 1 470 15.5
2000 1 345 17 758 1 457 15.8
2001 1 464 17 617 1 486 16.7
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rates.  Table 2 shows the average annual turnover rates for each of our
14 two-digit level industries.  There is quite a wide variability in numbers
across industries with the highest turnovers in 
 
clothing & footwear, printing
& publishing
 
, and 
 
electrical & electronic equipment
 
, and the lowest in
 
automobile, chemical industries, mineral industries
 
, and 
 
metallurgy
 
.
 
3.3. Productivity measurement
 
Following Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) and Good, Nadiri
and Sickles (1997), the TFP index for firm i at time t is measured as
followed:
(1)
where 
 
Y
 
it
 
 denotes firm i’s real gross output at time 
 
t
 
 using the set of inputs
 
X
 
nit
 
 (labour, capital and materials).  
 
S
 
nit
 
 is the cost share of input 
 
X
 
nit
 
 in the
total cost.  The symbols with an upper bar are the corresponding
measures for the reference point (the hypothetical firm).  They are
 
2. Turnover rate by industry
 
Number of firms Labour
Industry Entry Exit
 
Σ
 
Entry Exit
 
Σ
 
Clothing & Footwear 9.2 15.2 24.4 5.1 9.3 14.4
Printing & Publishing 9.2 11.0 20.1 5.4 6.6 12.1
Pharmaceutical 8.1 8.4 16.6 4.3 6.2 10.5
House Equipment 8.3 10.4 18.8 4.8 5.9 10.7
Automobile 7.3 7.1 14.4 7.2 6.6 13.8
Transportation Machinery 8.9 9.4 18.2 5.5 3.5 9.1
Machinery & Mechanical Equip. 9.7 9.8 19.5 5.0 5.5 10.6
Electrical & Electronic Equip. 11.9 12.4 24.2 5.4 5.4 10.8
Mineral 7.6 8.6 16.2 3.9 4.7 8.6
Textile 7.6 10.0 17.6 4.7 6.5 11.3
Wood, Paper & Pulp 8.0 9.0 17.1 4.8 5.8 10.6
Chemical 8.1 7.1 15.2 3.9 3.8 7.8
Metallurgy, Iron & Steel 8.0 7.9 15.9 6.1 5.2 11.3
Electrical & Electronic components 9.5 8.9 18.4 5.2 5.7 10.9
ln TFPit ln Yit ln Yt ln Yτ ln Yτ-1–( )
τ=2
t
∑+–=
1
2
-- Snit Snt+( ) ln Xnit ln Xnt–( )
n=1
N
∑–
1
2
-- Snτ Snτ-1+( ) ln Xnτ ln Xnτ-1–( )
n=1
N
∑
τ=2
t
∑–
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computed as the arithmetic mean of the corresponding firm level variables
over all firms in year t.  Subscripts τ and n are indices for time and inputs,
respectively.  This methodology is particularly suited to comparisons
within firm-level panel data sets as it guarantees the transitivity of any
comparison between two firm-year observations by expressing each firm's
input and output as deviations from a single reference point for each year.
The first characteristic in our dataset common to the firm-level
productivity literature is the degree of heterogeneity among firm produc-
tivity levels.  Table 3 presents several measures of this heterogeneity.  The
first column reports the annual standard deviation of productivity levels
computed for the whole database.  The second column shows the
difference between the log of productivity for the firm at the 90th
percentile and the log of productivity for the firm at the 10th percentile
(the 90-10 differential).  The spread in productivity between the firms in
the top deciles and the firms in the lowest deciles is about 40% for TFP and
150% for labour productivity.  The higher spread in labour productivity
can, at least in part, be explained by differences in input proportions.  The
90-50, 50-10 and 95-5 differentials are shown in the next three columns.
Note that all of these productivity dispersions are fairly stable over time,
suggesting persistent TFP heterogeneity at firm level.
In part, this heterogeneity reflects the variations in performances of
French manufacturing industries during the 1990-2002 period.  Figure 1
below depicts the average annual growth rates of TFP for each of the
14 manufacturing industries.  These industry productivity indexes are
computed by aggregating individual TFP indexes as follows:
(2)
where  is the share of the ith firm in the overall gross output of the
2-digit level industry to which it belongs and ln TFPi,t is the productivity
index for firm i.
Clearly, inter-industry differences contribute to heterogeneity in the
productivity distribution of firms.  Note in particular, the difference
between the two main sectors, Electric and Electronic Equipments and
Electric and Electronic Components, which are obviously boosted by the
development of information technologies, and the rest.  However,
industry differentials account for only a small part of firm heterogeneity.
The analysis of variance shows that less than 20% of TFP heterogeneity can
be explained by industry effects.  This suggests that, independent of the
industry under consideration, some firms are intrinsically more productive
than others.  How those differences in firms’ productivity relate to entry
and exit patterns both at the aggregate (whole manufacturing) and at the
industry levels requires investigation.
ln TFPI,t θi,t
i
∑ ln TFPi,t=
θi,t
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4. Post-entry performance
Drawing on the current literature on entry process (whether
conventional or evolutionary), and considering that imperfect competition
is likely to prevail in manufacturing goods markets, at least two different
and complementary types of selection mechanisms involved in the entry
process can be identified.  First, entry can reveal information on new firms
about their relative abilities at birth.  Either they perform well from the
outset, because they embody an intrinsically better technological capacity
3. Variability in Productivity
Year St. Dev. 90 - 10 90 - 50 50 - 10 95 - 5
Total Factor Productivity (LnTFP)
1990 0.177 0.394 0.191 0.203 0.538
1991 0.184 0.396 0.187 0.210 0.547
1992 0.177 0.393 0.184 0.209 0.545
1993 0.182 0.404 0.186 0.219 0.552
1994 0.197 0.393 0.183 0.210 0.553
1995 0.178 0.385 0.185 0.200 0.539
1996 0.174 0.383 0.183 0.200 0.541
1997 0.179 0.382 0.188 0.194 0.536
1998 0.175 0.382 0.193 0.190 0.533
1999 0.195 0.398 0.205 0.194 0.557
2000 0.185 0.403 0.211 0.192 0.549
2001 0.183 0.406 0.213 0.193 0.553
2002 0.186 0.414 0.222 0.192 0.575
Labour Productivity (Ln Y/L)
1990 0.641 1.507 0.785 0.722 2.179
1991 0.635 1.493 0.779 0.714 2.143
1992 0.625 1.465 0.780 0.686 2.088
1993 0.629 1.473 0.780 0.693 2.097
1994 0.647 1.497 0.801 0.697 2.142
1995 0.639 1.488 0.802 0.686 2.100
1996 0.635 1.464 0.798 0.666 2.089
1997 0.645 1.482 0.813 0.668 2.101
1998 0.647 1.491 0.822 0.669 2.120
1999 0.652 1.488 0.816 0.672 2.111
2000 0.658 1.519 0.846 0.673 2.123
2001 0.645 1.491 0.827 0.664 2.074
2002 0.636 1.480 0.828 0.652 2.028
Note: Standard deviation and percentile differences for LnTFP and LnY/L.
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(a vintage effect argument)9 or they lag behind from the start, due to
insufficient ability to face competitive pressure.  Post entry selection will
result in only those firms that progressively exhibit sufficiently high
efficiency levels surviving.  Second, firms learn from market functioning, and
post-entry learning can provide knowledge about how to produce more
efficiently.  If this type of learning is dominant, surviving entrants will be
those most able to progress and improve productivity in the years after
entry.10 These arguments are not mutually exclusive as ex ante ability is
not the only source of firm heterogeneity;11 benefiting from market
information and related learning will be more effective if initial
technological capability is high and effective in the market. 
In this Section, we demonstrate the relative importance of these two
types of learning by examining the post-entry performance of new
entrants.  We proceed in three stages.  First, we trace in time the average
productivity (TFP) of each entry cohort relative to the incumbents.
Second, we discriminate further between successful and unsuccessful
entrants and compare productivity levels not only among themselves, but
also between them and incumbents.  Third, we examine how these
productivity gaps are related to changes in relative size and profitability of
the two types of entrants: successful and unsuccessful. 
1. Industry TFP growth (average annual growth rates)
9. The underlying argument is that a best practice frontier, which evolves over time and is
exogenous to the industry, is exclusively available to new firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 2001;
Dwyer, 1998).
10. This type of learning is operating in the Ericson and Pakes (1989) model.  It is also
emphasised in evolutionary models in which new firms are assumed to be less experienced in terms
of routines and best practice and have to acquire them after entry. 
11. This extreme assumption prevails for instance in the Jovanovic (1982) model. 
Electric & Electronic Equipt
Electric Electronic Components
House Equipt
Clothing & Footwear
Chemical
Pharmaceuticals
Automobile
Textile
Machinery & Mechanical Equipt
Wood, Paper & Pulp
Mineral
Printing & Publishing
Transportation
Metallurgy, Iron & Steel
0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
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Table 4 summarises the first step.  It traces the average productivity of
entry cohorts relative to incumbent firms over time.  For instance, the first
line reports the average productivity of the 1990 entry cohort in 1990,
1991, 1992, etc., relative to the productivity of incumbent firms in the
corresponding years.  In this Table, incumbents are defined as the
population of firms born before 1990 and surviving throughout the period
of investigation.12 Each entry cohort is composed of firms that enter the
database that year and survive at least until 2002.  This ensures that the
results reflect the evolution only of the relative performance of entrants.
They are not affected by market selection mechanisms, which could bias
the average performance by eliminating low performing firms.  The relative
TFP of entrant i for period t and industry J is defined by:
(3)
where  denotes the average TFP of incumbent firms at time t in
industry J.  The relative productivity of the entry cohort is then defined as
the unweighted average of relative individual TFP indexes.  A negative
number means that new entrants have a productivity disadvantage relative
to incumbent firms while a positive number reveals a productivity
advantage.
The first important result emerging from Table 4 is that generally
entrants very quickly exhibit higher productivity as compared to incumbent
firms.  This result holds for each entry cohort from 1990 to 2002 and for
almost all years of observation.  Note that the few exceptions are never
significant at the 0.05 level.  The fact that new entrants rapidly outperform
continuing firms suggests a very fast and effective learning process.  This
result is consistent with the vintage hypothesis according to which new
firms embody better technology than older ones.  Moreover, the
differential for incumbents is highest in the three to four years after entry,
which implies that an intrinsic advantage from entry is strengthened by
market information.  It is interesting that this relative advantage persists
over time, for more than ten years for the oldest cohorts. 
However, another interesting structural pattern in relation to entry
cohorts is their small relative size.  Table 5 traces the relative size, in terms
of number of employees, of entry cohorts within the years after entry.  It
appears that, at the year of entry, the size of entrants is around half of the
size of incumbents.  Moreover, this size disadvantage does not disappear
in the post-entry period.  If they progressively increased in size relative to
incumbents, even one decade after entry, they would still be smaller (by a
third) than incumbents.  This observation underlines the small importance
of internal improvements in entrants’ post-entry behaviour.  It implies that
12.  While our investigation focuses on the 1990-2002 period, we can trace a firm back to 1984. 
ln TFPJ,i,tr ln TFPJ,i,t ln TFPJ,tinc–=
ln TFPJ,tinc
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there is inertia within the industry structures, and shows that replacement
of incumbents by entrants would be unlikely or very slow.
Tables 6 and 7 allow direct comparison between the performances of
successful and failing entrants.  Successful entrants are defined as firms
that survive more than 6 years.  Failing entrants are defined as firms that
failed within the 6 years after entry.  In these tables, entry cohorts are
pooled in order to emphasise general trends in the improving process of
new firms.
The first Column (E/I) reports TFP differences between all entrants and
incumbents.  The next two columns (SE/I and FE/I) compare the produc-
tivity gaps between successful and failing entrants respectively, and incum-
bent firms.  The last column in the Table shows TFP differences between
entrants.
Several features emerge from this.  First, we note that from the third
period onwards, entrants enjoy higher average productivity levels than
incumbents.  This suggests a very fast learning process for new entrants
and is consistent with the vintage hypothesis.  Second, this aggregate result
must be refined by comparing successful and failing entrants, whose
behaviours are different.  While successful entrants quickly benefit from a
marked productivity advantage over incumbents, failing entrants exhibit a
substantial negative productivity gap from the time of entry and never
recover.  Those results are similar to those of Farinas and Ruano (2005)
who also found a systematic gap between failing and surviving entrants.
Thus, this more refined population analysis argues for the existence of a
selection mechanism in which failing entrants seem to be condemned from
6. Relative TFP by the number of years after entry (log difference)
Years E / I SE / I FE / I FE / SE 
1 –0.015 –0.003 –0.019 –0.031
2 –0.002 0.018 –0.012 –0.044
3 0.003 0.018 –0.007 –0.043
4 0.006 0.016 –0.005 –0.046
5 0.006 0.014 –0.007 –0.057
6 0.007 0.011 –0.012 –0.049
7 0.008 0.008
8 0.009 0.009
9 0.010 0.010
10 0.013 0.013
E = entrants, I = Incumbents, SE = surviving entrants,
FE = failing entrants
Numbers in italics indicate significance at 5% level.
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the start.  They show a relative disadvantage that they never manage to
overcome, despite a relative improvement before their exit. 
Table 7 considers the improvement process of new entrants based on
relative size (measured by employment) and profitability.  Tables 7a and 7b
are similar to Table 5 except that relative profitability and size indexes in
these tables are ratios and not differences.  Consequently, unity indicates
identical performance (compared to nullity in Table 6).  Again, entry
cohorts are pooled to emphasise general trends, and successful entrants
7. Relative performances by the number of years after entry (ratios)
7a. Relative Profitability
Years E/I SE/I FE/I FE/SE
1 –15.813 –12.658 –16.855 –0.132
2 0.536 0.962 0.325 0.143
3 0.608 0.895 0.396 0.413
4 0.805 0.889 0.709 0.385
5 0.908 0.950 0.829 0.283
6 0.898 0.923 0.798 0.264
7 0.930 0.930
8 0.997 0.997
9 1.042 1.042
10 1.033 1.033
E = entrants, I = Incumbents, SE = surviving entrants, FE = failing entrants.
Numbers in italics indicate significance at 5% level.
7b. Relative Employment
Years E/I SE/I FE/I FE/SE
1 0.438 0.529 0.408 0.676
2 0.485 0.552 0.452 0.718
3 0.539 0.566 0.519 0.759
4 0.552 0.578 0.524 0.786
5 0.562 0.584 0.522 0.746
6 0.574 0.589 0.516 0.740
7 0.586 0.586
8 0.632 0.632
9 0.660 0.660
10 0.677 0.677
E = entrants, I = Incumbents, SE = surviving entrants, FE = failing entrants.
Numbers in italics indicate significance at 5% level.
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(SE) versus failing entrants (FE) are compared not only with incumbents (I)
but also with themselves.  Table 7a reports relative profitability indexes for
these different populations of firms.  At firm level, profitability is measured
by the ratio of operating-cash flow on sales.  At population level, relative
indexes correspond to the unweighted average of relative individual
indexes. 
Tables 7a demonstrates the ability of some entrants (the survivors) to
compete successfully against some others (their failing counterparts) and
to grow rapidly enough to survive.  Whereas the profitability of entrants
as a whole (E) apparently follows a regular catching-up process towards
the profitability levels of incumbent firms (1 means equal performance),
the picture changes radically if we discriminate between the two sub-
populations of successful (SE) and failing (FE) entrants. 
On the one hand, successful entrants catch up very quickly to the
profitability levels of incumbent firms.  On the other hand, failing entrants
also begin to catch up, but at a much slower rate.  Note that the
mechanism underlying the catching up process of the FE population may
be due to a selection process (i.e. the exit of the least profitable firms
within 3 years after entry).  Unsuccessful entrants that survive until age 5
and 6 do not exhibit similar weak relative performances.  This suggests that
those firms were catching up, not falling behind, but that the process was
neither strong enough nor fast enough to allow them to survive in the face
of competitive pressure from the rest (young surviving firms and
incumbents). 
Table 7b reports relative employment levels for different populations
of firms.  Once more, the E/I show a catching-up dynamic although we
should bear in mind that we have established that new entrants remain
relatively small compared to incumbent firms even 10 years after entry.
This is consistent with the literature on post-entry performance especially
in relation to European countries (see for instance Carreira and Teixeira,
2003: 10).  By contrast, successful US entrants are characterised by much
higher growth rates after entry (see Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi
2005), and their recent comparative analysis of European and US firm
demographies).
If we now consider the sub-populations of SE and FE, two main results
emerge.  First, it appears that the initial size of failing entrants is significantly
smaller than the initial size of successful entrants.  This may indicate that
failing entrants are from the outset penalised by their relative smaller size,
and that this relative size disadvantage translates into a productivity
disadvantage.  Note that the size gap relative to successful entrants is quite
high (20% to 30%).  The second finding is that FE experience lower growth
rates (compared to SE) in their efforts to achieve a similar size to
incumbents, but they still follow a catching up process towards the average
employment level of incumbent firms.
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The above discussion is based on the estimation of relative levels within
a population analysis (SE, FE, I); it does not provide information about the
growth rates of those populations.  Table 8 shows the growth rates for
size (labour) and TFP (log) for the successful and failing entrant
populations.  It validates some of the previous interpretative comments,
notably those related to the differences in performance behaviours and
related selection mechanisms. 
It should be noted that, for the whole sample, the unweighted average
of firm-level labour and TFP growth on the decade is respectively about
0.10% and 0.40%.  Successful entrants exhibit a persisting and significant
advantage over both failing entrants and the rest of the firms.  Interestingly,
the growth rates of size for successful entrants is continuously decreasing
over time, despite the fact that they maintain an intrinsic and continuous
advantage in terms of TFP.  Although increasing in size, successful entrants
are not able to catch-up to the average size level of the industry (see
Table 5).  This observation is compatible with a continuous and persistent
improvement in TFP in that population.  Note also that the gap between
successful and failing entrants is pronounced from the start, i.e. from date
of entry.  This, on the whole, suggests that, if post-entry behaviour
matters, most selection mechanisms seem to derive from the conditions at
entry.
At this stage, we should note that TFP relative to incumbents allows us
to discriminate between the population of failing and successful entrants.
Even if, on average, successful entrants have a relative disadvantage at date
of entry, they quickly catch-up and soon perform better than incumbents.
The magnitude of the catching-up process differs widely among successful
and failing entrants.  This would indicate the existence of an enhancement
effect, whereby initial conditions at entry affect the ability to learn about
the market and to ensure post-entry survival.  Selection mechanisms are
8. Growth rate of size and TFP (successful and failing firms, in percentage)
Years Labour lnTFP
SE FE SE FE
1   5.58   2.53 2.38 1.63
2   4.25   1.90 0.47 0.82
3   3.57   0.00 0.39 0.72
4   3.14 –1.14 0.45 0.16
5   2.60 –2.36 0.37 0.33
6   0.81 0.40
7   0.64 0.49
8   0.20 0.60
9 –0.10 0.67
10 –1.47 0.88
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then a mix between an intrinsic initial capability to outperform incumbents
(a vintage effect) and learning from the market as a result of post-entry
behaviour.
5. Pre-exit performance of mature firms
In this Section, we use the time series dimension of our data set in order
to investigate pre-exit performance of mature firms.  Neoclassical models
of industry dynamics predict that exit mechanisms are driven by a minimum
productivity threshold below which the firm decides to exit the market.
Empirical analysis largely validates this hypothesis; there is general consen-
sus that exiting firms are concentrated in the lower productivity ranges
(Baily, Hulten and Campbell 1992; Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan 1998).
Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001) and Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) found a
mean productivity difference among cohorts of continuing and exiting firms
that is significantly lower for exiting firms from Korean and Taiwanese data.
Farinas and Ruano (2005) estimated that the productivity distribution of
surviving firms stochastically dominates the distribution of exiting firms,
confirming that exiting firms come from the group of least productive firms.
If exiting cohorts systematically exhibit a productivity disadvantage
compared with their surviving counterparts in the year of their exit, we
need to investigate why this arises, i.e. how the performance of exiting
cohorts evolves in the years prior to exit.  Griliches and Regev (1995)
pointed to the existence of what they call a “shadow of death” effect,
which refers to the fact that a performance gap exists between exiting and
surviving firms in the years before the exit year.  Few studies have
addressed this issue, and their results are contradictory (see for example
Almus, 2000, on German data sets).  Most existing empirical studies
address the shadow of death effect taking the evolution of employment
growth rate as the main indicator.  We examine it using size/employment,
TFP, and profitability as indicators.  Labour productivity is also included in
the tables, but mainly as a control variable. 
Table 9 displays the relative TFP performance of exiting cohorts.  The
reference population in each column are firms of more than five years that
are present in the data base for the whole period (1990 to 2002).  Each
row expresses the evolution of relative TFP difference between each
exiting cohort (from 1990 to 2001) and the corresponding population of
incumbents. 
There are two major findings from this Table.  First all exit cohorts are
performing less well than the surviving firms long before the exit year.
Second this observation is always significant for each cohort not only at
date of exit, but also in the years prior to exit.  Moreover, the gap tends
to increase gradually as we approach the exit date.  Thus, in terms of TFP,
we found the existence of a shadow of death effect in all exit cohorts.  On
the whole, these results are quite similar to those in Kiyota (2005).
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We build on these results by adding size and profitability as
performance indicators.  Here, we pooled the exiting firms and developed
a population analysis comparing their relative performance with surviving
firms (those surviving more than five years).
A noticeable feature is the continuous decrease in the relative perfor-
mance of exiting firms for each performance indicator.  Relative TFP
gradually decreases along the 10 years period before the exit date; it is
always negative 10 years before exit date, even when it is no longer
significant 9 years before exit date.  Relative profitability and size continu-
ously decrease and are significant 9 years and 4 years respectively, before
exit date.  Relative profitability is shown to be much higher, and the
magnitude sharply increases during the 4 years period prior to exit.
Therefore, the evolution of firm profitability is probably the most relevant
indicator for firm exit mechanisms.  Contrary to other contributions (see
Van der Wiel, 1999), we found a remarkably similar trend for all three
performance indicators indicating the existence of a shadow of death effect
in our data set.  Finally, relative labour productivity is always negative; this
can be thought of as indicating systematically weaker capital intensity of
exiting firms.
These results are fairly stable and robust.  Table 11 provides similar
information to Table 10, but for a different reference population.  Instead
of taking the mature firms in the sample, we adopted a parametric
matching method, similar to Almus (2000), to compare exiting firms with
the sub-set of their most similar surviving counterparts.  The match was
performed for the following initial characteristics: initial firm size, year of
entry, 4 digit industry classification, legal form, and initial number of
establishments.
10. TFP, Profitability and Size differences by number of years prior to exit
Prior to exit (in  Years) TFP (log) P (lev) S (lev) LP (log)
10 –0.007 0.990 1.101 –0.072
9 –0.007 0.902 1.030 –0.062
8 –0.010 0.910 0.950 –0.052
7 –0.014 0.853 0.901 –0.049
6 –0.016 0.797 0.911 –0.055
5 –0.018 0.799 0.834 –0.056
4 –0.022 0.750 0.793 –0.067
3 –0.031 0.645 0.737 –0.089
2 –0.041 0.548 0.665 –0.109
1 –0.050 0.391 0.621 –0.121
0 –0.059 0.235 0.564 –0.129
Numbers in italics indicate significance at 5% level.
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The previous (non matching) results are essentially affected in two
ways.  First, the matching method improves the magnitude of exiting firms’
decreased performance, especially relative TFP growth rates.  As such, it
adds weight to the existence of a shadow-of-death effect in that it extends
the period, prior to exit, in which significant lower performance of exiting
firms can be shown.  Second, it improves the significance of the results, at
least for relative TFP and profitability.  Relative size is not affected. 
From previous comments, it can be seen that relative TFP gaps are very
significant to identify market selection as far as the pre-exit behaviour of
exiting firms is concerned.  Therefore, TFP can be thought of as the
appropriate variable to identify the conditions required to survive in the
market and to demonstrate the degree and persistency of firm
heterogeneity characterising the market selection process.  Moreover, the
existence of a shadow of death effect can be interpreted in two ways: it
could mean that market selection is not effective enough and allows firms
to survive for longer, or it might mean that market selection is efficient, but
allows firms to recognise that they need to leave the market allowing them
to gradually adjust downward especially in terms of their employment
level, before they actually exit the market (Almus, 2000).
In the next Section we focus on productivity decomposition patterns in
order to discuss the relative contribution of the different populations of
firms to aggregate productivity improvements.
6. Productivity Decomposition
The two previous Sections developed a mainly descriptive approach to
firm heterogeneity based on population analysis, by highlighting post-entry
11. TFP, Profitability and Size differences by number of years prior to exit 
(with matching)
Prior to exit (in  Years) TFP (log) P (lev) S (lev) LP (log)
10 –0.032 0.839 1.219 –0.177
9 –0.035 0.802 1.146 –0.164
8 –0.039 0.761 1.015 –0.152
7 –0.047 0.706 0.946 –0.163
6 –0.051 0.671 0.946 –0.175
5 –0.061 0.664 0.822 –0.191
4 –0.070 0.619 0.747 –0.221
3 –0.081 0.527 0.680 –0.254
2 –0.094 0.445 0.613 –0.288
1 –0.107 0.308 0.564 –0.313
0 –0.123 0.206 0.529 –0.333
Numbers in italics indicate significance at 5% level.
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and pre-exit behaviours of firms.  It is useful to complement this population
analysis by decomposing the contributions of each population’s contribu-
tion to aggregate productivity growth.  This can be achieved looking at
changes in both inputs and outputs of individual firms over time.  This
reallocation occurs through internal and external reallocation.  The former
essentially refers to internal firm productivity improvements and the latter
can be the result either of a redistribution of market shares to the benefit
of the best performing firms, or of a positive net entry effect (where the
gains due to new entrants, are larger than the losses due to exiting firms).
Both effects result from the heterogeneity characteristics already discussed
and it is interesting to look at their macro-economic incidence.
Remember that, according to equation (2), the manufacturing-wide
productivity index in year t can be computed as
(4)
where  is the output share of firm i and pi,t a productivity measure
(labour productivity or TFP).  Following the Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan
(1998) method, a change in aggregate productivity (∆P) between t – 1 and
t can be written as:
(5)
where S, N and X denote respectively firms that survive, enter and exit
between t and t – 1.  The first term in (5) shows the contribution to
productivity growth of growth within the surviving firms (within effect).
The second term shows the between-survivors effect (external effect).
The third term is an additional covariance term which is positive when firm
market share changes in the same direction as productivity.  As variation
in market share is a consequence of market activity, this third term is also
often considered as external to the firm.  The last two terms show the
contribution of entry and exit (net entry effect).  Table 12 expresses
overall productivity improvement (TFP and labour productivity) for the
whole period.
With regard to TFP improvements, the internal effect is relatively low
compared to Baily, Hulten and Campbell’s (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger
and Krizan’s (2002) findings.  However, it is higher when compared to Aw,
Chen and Roberts’ (2001) and Carreira and Teixeira’s (2003) findings
using firm level data.  The dominant effect in productivity improvement is
gains from external reallocation (80%).  The latter is mostly obtained
ln Pt θi,t ln pi,t
i
∑=
θi,t
∆P θi,t-1∆ pi,t
i S∈
∑ ∆θi,t pi,t-1 Pt-1–( ) ∆θi,t∆ pi,t
i S∈
∑+
i S∈
∑+=
                     
Internal effect External effect
 θi,t pi,t Pt-1–( ) θi,t-1 pi,t-1 Pt-1–( )
i X∈
∑–
i N∈
∑+
                
Net entry effect
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through displacement effects within industries whereas the net entry effect
(gains from entrants minus losses from exiting firms) is relatively weak,
again compared to the results in the literature.  This observation is
probably due to the specificity of entrants within our sample; we showed
already how they were initially smaller and performed less well than
incumbents at the time of entry.  However, we probably underestimated
at the aggregate level the actual effect of entry on productivity
improvement as we also show how their relative disadvantage at entry
(negative value) was disappearing and was substituted by a consistent
durability of positive advantage along the post-entry period.  Therefore, in
our case, this post-entry effect shifted to an internal effect.
Labour productivity improvements were more significant for internal
effects (75%), than external effects (25%).  This is logical in that it reflects
the increase in the capital/labour ratio resulting from firm investment and
growth.  On the whole, evidence from TFP decomposition allows us to
map the existence of a process of ‘creative destruction’ that allows for
productivity growth.  Interestingly, this process of creative destruction
derives more from restructuring and reallocation across producers than
from novelty in itself, assuming this latter feature is embodied in the new
firms (entrants).  This emphasises the complicated character of market
selection processes and the importance of considering the dynamic trends
that characterise the competitive process within a market (an industry)
among different categories of producers (either restructuring of incum-
bents, or the transformation of successful entrants into incumbents). 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed market selection mechanisms from French
manufacturing goods markets over the 1990-2002 period.  This empirical
investigation produced the following results.
First, we found that successful entrants exhibit a productivity advantage
at birth that is not fully exploited over time to achieve the average firm size
within the sector.  This suggests the existence of barriers to growth in the
sense that, even if successful entrants have TFP and profitability advantag-
es, they do not easily catch up with the average firm size in the industry.
12. Productivity Growth Decomposition, 1990-2002
Total Internal effect External effect Net entry
lnTFP
1.1 0.2 0.8 0.1
100.0 18.5 75.1 6.4
Ln(Y/L)
5.3 4.0 2.0 – 0.8
100.0 75.8 38.7 – 14.5
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Second, we found that exiting firms, as a whole, display below-average
performance levels and are significantly smaller than their surviving counter-
parts.  We nonetheless found distinguishing features among exit patterns by
comparing young and mature firms.  Young exiting firms display a relatively
small productivity disadvantage relative to either successful entrants or
incumbent firms, while mature exiting firms display a large productivity
disadvantage relative to their surviving counterparts.  This gap widens at the
year of exit, but emerges several years prior to exit.  More precisely, we
found a shadow of death effect existed for each of the performance
indicators (relative TFP, profitability and size).  This could indicate that, as
far as mature firms are concerned, French markets select against persistent
bad performers but not against temporary losses of efficiency.  This stylised
fact can be interpreted in two ways.  It might be that markets are efficient as
they evaluate firms on a medium rather than a short term horizon.  On the
other hand, it might be indicative of a sort of inertia in industry structures as
market selection processes favour established firms against new entrants,
the latter being more heavily rejected than the former. 
Third, we show that aggregate TFP growth is mainly driven by the
reallocation of market shares in favour of more productive firms.  The so-
called internal effect resulting from TFP improvements in individual firms
(due to learning by doing or technological change) accounts for less than
20% of manufacturing TFP growth.
Finally we conclude that micro data from French manufacturing industries
on average behave in a way that is consistent with the generally accepted
view that market selection mechanisms favour the most efficient firms.
However, the institutions that contribute to markets’ operating this selec-
tion process seem to be more severe on young firms than mature firms. 
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APPENDIX
Main variables for TFP computation
All nominal output and input variables are available at firm level.
Industry level data are used for price indexes, hours worked and
depreciation rates.
1. Output
Gross output (sales) is deflated using sectoral price indexes published
by INSEE (French System of National Accounts).
2. Labour input
Labour input is obtained by multiplying the number of effective
workers13 by the average hours worked each year at industry level.  This
choice was made because there are no data on hours worked in the EAE
survey.  Note that a decrease in hours worked occurs between 1999 and
2000 because of the specific “French 35 hours policy”.  (On average, hours
worked fell from 38.39 in 1999 to 36.87 in 2000).
3. Capital input
Capital stocks are computed from investment and book values of
tangible assets14 following the traditional perpetual inventory method
(PIM):
Kt = (1 – δt - 1) Kt - 1 + It
where δt is the depreciation rate and It is real investment (deflated nominal
investment).15
4. Materials
Materials are deflated using sectoral price indexes published by INSEE
(French System of National Accounts).
13.  The number of effective workers is the number of employees plus the number of
outsourced workers minus workers taken from other firms. 
14.  For each year, we rely on the book values reported at the end of the accounting exercise. 
15.  Both investment price indexes and depreciation rates are available at the 2-digit industry
classification level.
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5. Labour and capital cost shares
With w and c being respectively wage rate and user cost of capital,
CTkt = wktLkt + cktKkt+ mItMkt represents the total cost of production of
firm k at time t.  Labour and capital cost shares are then respectively given
by:16
 and  
To compute the labour cost share, we rely on the variable “labour
compensation” in the EAE survey.  This value includes total wages paid to
salaries plus income tax withholding, and is used to approximate the
theoretical variable wkLk. 
We compute the user cost of capital using Hall's (1988) methodology
where the user cost of capital (i.e. the rental of capital) in the presence of
a proportional tax on business income and of a fiscal depreciation formula,
is given by:17
where τt is the business income tax in period t and zI denotes the present
value of the depreciation deduction18 on one nominal unit investment in
industry I. 
16.  For simplicity, we make abstractions of temporal indices when this does not lead to
confusion.
17.  In this equation, we abstract from the tax credit allowance. 
18.  Complex depreciation formula can be employed for tax purposes in France.  To simplify,
we choose to rely on the usual following depreciation formula: 
 where δI is the mean of industrial deprecation rates for the period 1984-
2002 and  is the mean of nominal interest rates for the period 1990-2002. 
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